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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATif. OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

JAN GEORGE HANSEN,

Case No.
12940

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE

STATE~IENT

This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to
the crime of second degree burglary.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury found the appellant guilty of burglary
in the second degree in the Third J u<licial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March
10, rn72. Appellant was sentenced to serve the indeterminate sentence as provided by law.

UELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
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Third .J wlicial District Court, Honorable .Toscph G.
Jeppson, Judge, should Le affirmed.

STATEMENT OF TIIE FACTS
Respondent stipulates to appellant's statement of
the facts except as follows:
On gaining entry to the market, one officer proceeded to search the attic and found the appellant in a
ventilator shaft with only his shoes and buttocks visible
( 63). The appellant had apparently gained entrance to
the lmilcling· hy smashing a hole in its roof which was
constrncte<l out of wood and tar ( H5) .
.Appellant took the stand and con firmed that at the
time of his arrest on the instant charge he was on pro·
hation for a second degree burglary conviction in 1970
( D7, lOD). He claimed that on the night in question he
Juul taken hrn LSD and two sleeping tablets (98). No
one saw him ingest the tablets which he claimed to have
done at about 9:00 p.m. (107, llO). Shortly thereafter
the appellant, drin·n by a friend, proceeded into down·
town Salt Lake City where he allegedly began having
hallucinations in which he saw castles ( 104<). The ap·
pella11t a11cl his companion arrived in the vicinity of the
market approximately one hour later whereupon the
appellant asked to be dropped off ( 106). Appellant
testified that he was familiar with the market since he
had shopped there on other occasions ( 103-04).
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J\ state toxicologist thought it quite probable that
a t wo-tahlet <lose of both LSD and barhituates, if actually taken and of the typical potency, would cause substantial disarrangement ( 121). He cautioned, however,
that the effect of harbituates and LSD taken in combination was still open to question and that his opinion
was therefore purely spectulative (119).

The three anesting officers offered generally corroborating testimony as to appellant's mental and physi<'al capacity. The first officer testified that the appellant acted "strange" ( 6()), but that he did appear to
lun-e control of his body ( 70). He testified under crossexamination that the reactions of LSD users were difficult to predict since he had observed so many varied
responses ( 77). The second officer also testified that
appellant's physical ability seemed unimpaired and adderl that appellant seemed unresponsive to directions
(DO) . The third officer confirmed the fact that the appellant whimpered and babbled on the way to the police
station ( 127), hut he did think that appellant understood on being questioned and being given the Miranda
warning (123-25).
The state introduced a small hacksaw, a tire iron,
a pair of gloves, a flashlight and a pair of pliers into
evidence-all allegedly used by appellant on the night
in question. All but the last two exhibits were admitted
(63, 73-74). The store manager testified that the cigarette cartons which had been removed from the front of
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the store were neatly stacked in a large cardboard box
next to the rear door ( 82-8:3). Ile noted further that
two auxiliary drawers in each of two cash registers had
been pried upon ( 80) awl that a desk had been broken
into and its contents scattered ( 81).

ARGUnlENT
POINT I
THE COURT UELO\V DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S RE(~UESTED INSTRUCTION l~,OR Tll}~ LESSER OFFENSE OF UNLA \VFUL ENTRY. THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SI-IOULD l3E
FPHRLD ON ONE OF T\VO ALTERNATIVE
GROUNDS:
A. UNLA"\YFUL ENTRY IS NOT A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE
CRil\lE Olj' SECO~D DEGREE BURGLARY.
To be "necessarily included' in the offense charged,
the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to
commit the greater without having first committed the
lesser. Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80 (10th Cir.
19()1). This rule has been consistently followed by this
Court. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811
(1970); State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371P.2d27
(1962); State v. TVoolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640
( 1934). The 1'Voolman court stated the rule with somewhat greater particularity:
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The only way this matter [whether or not one
offense is included in another] may be determined is by discoverning all of the elements
required hy the respective sections, comparing
them and by a process of inclusion and exclusion determine those common and those not
common, and if the greater offense includes all
the legal and factual elements, it may safely
be said that the greater includes the lesser. 84
Utah at 35, 33 P.2d at 645.
'Vhen this test is applied to Utah's second degree
burglary and unlawful entry statutes, it is apparent
that they differ in one very significant respect: burglary
requires that the intent "to commit larceny or any other
felony" be proved, whereas unlawful entry, requires
only that the intent "to damage property or to injure a
person or annoy the peace and quiet .... " be established.
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 ( 1953) with Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-9 (Supp. 1971). It is submitted that
the difference in the intent requirement between the
two crimes precludes the one crime from being necessarily inclmled in the other under the test set forth above.

State v. I1adley, 364 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. 1963),
stands for exactly this proposition. In Hadley, the appellant was convicted of attempted burglary. On appeal,
he assigned error to the trial court's failure to instruct
the jury on a lesser charge of breaking and entering
which required the intent to "injure or destroy" prop-
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erty. The ~Tissouri Court, noting that the burglary
charge required an intent ''to steal or commit any
crime . . . . '', hel<l that the malicious destruction or inj ming of property is not a lesser included of fcnse of
second degree burglary. 3G4< S.,V.2d at 517. The California Supreme Court expressed a similar conclusion by
way of dictum in People v. Proctor, 4G Cal.2d 481, 296
P.2d 821 (Hl56). State v. Garrett, 2G3 N.C. 754, 140
S.E.2d 311 (19()5) is also on point. In Garrett the court
noted that:
The charges of house breaking for the purpose
of committing a felony do not include malicifJus
or intentional injury to the buildings as lesser
offenses. 140 S.E.2<1 ·at 315.
'Vhile this Court has never expressly addressed itself' to this narrow issue, it appears to he in substantial
agreement "·ith the governing principles. In /•)tate v.
Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 45G P.2d 154 (1969), for example,
the eourt held that the unlawful taking offense was not
neeessarily included within the grand larceny charge,
suggesting that the difference in the specific intent re·
quirements for the respective crimes was decisive of the
issue. The court said:
In the instant case the jury found the appellant guilty of intending to deprive the owner
permanently of the use of his car, and we cannot see why they should also have been required to decide if he only intended to deprive
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the owner temporarily. 1 1he two crimes are
based in contrarlJ intentions in the mind of the
defendant. 2:3 Utah 2d at 16 (emphasis added);
accord, Sandoval v. People, 490 P.2d 1298
(Colo. 1971).
The reasoning in Ash and the other cases herein cited
compels the conclusion that differences in specific intent requirements constitute materially significant distinctions between cl·imes. liencc, under the Utah rule,
it is impossible that the crime of unlawful entry be necessarily includetl in the charge of second degree burglary.

ASSUl\IING AHGUENDO THAT THE
OFFENSE. OF UNLA "TFUL ENTRY IS INCLl TDED IN THE CHARGE OF SECOND DEUREE BlJUGLARY, A UEASONABLE VIEW
OF TIIE EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY
THE SUBl\IISSION OF THE REQUESTED
IXSTRUCTJON ON THE LESSER INCLUDE]) OFFENSE TO THE JURY.
B.

The general rule followed in this state is that a trial
court need not in every case instruct on lesser included
crimes; it must do so only where, under some reasonable view of the evidence, there is a basis for finding
the accused innocent of the higher crime and yet guilty
of the lower one. See State v. Gillian, supra; State v .
.Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947). This rule
has also been embodied in our statutes. Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-33-6 ( 1953). Appellant cites a number of cases
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whieh generally support this rnle hut none of whieh suggest how it should he applied in the case at bar. l\Iore
specifically, appellant fails to come to grips with the
narrow issue now before this court: wouhl the evidence
a<1ducell lrnve rcasonabl,ll led the jury or the court to conclwle that the appellant was innocent of second degree
burglary and yet guilty of unlawful entry'?
There are two Utah cases which suggest the outlines of a possible standard against which the facts of
this case can he tested. In short, that standard is that
the eourt will not i1u1nlge ev-ery presumption in favor
o t' instructing on the lesser offense; rather, it will in1
1
• .. : : l Ji;.
efenrl:mt cle:irly show that he has su hstantia I reasonable grounds for requesting the instruction.
1
" .. , , . .1.J<ulge, 18 Utah 2d G3, 415 P.2d 212 (l!">GG),
the defendant was caught in the act of breaking into a
safe. Ile was convicted arnl appealed, claiming that
the trial court cne<l in not instructing the jury on the
offense of unlawful entry. The Dod~c court dill not
reach the issue of whether unla\'dul entry was an included offense of burglary. Instead, it was content to
ohsene that the jury would have been composed of unreasonable men had it even considered that the def en<lant entered with the "altruistic intent to damage property or to injure a person or annoy the peace .... " and
that the court would hnse acted just as unreasonably
had it given such an instruction. 18 Utah 2<l at 64-65.
In State v. JlcCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890
( 1971), defendant was caught in the act of stealing
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twcntr-three hams from a supermarket. Nineteen hams
Juul been earried away from the store's meat department
and another four ha<l heen placed in a box nearby. The
clc /'c11da11 t was convicted of grand larceny and appealed,
claiming that the trial court erred in not instructing the
jury on the lesser offense of petit larcency. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning, as it had in Dodge,
that the evidence was illsufficient to support the contention.
The instant case is very similar to Dodge and
,;lfd'arfh/f in that the oYerwhelming weight of evidence

points to the appellant's guilt of the greater offense.
The appellant had smashed a hole in the market's roof
alHl had apparently brought along instruments with
\\'hieh to aceoplish that task. The court might at this
juncture profitably note People v. II enderso11,, 138 Cal.
A pp.2d 5ot), 2!)2 P .2d 267 ( ID5G), wherein the California court suggests that "burglarious intent could be
infcned from the forcible and unlawful entry alone."
2!)2 P .2d at 2GD. Furthermore, appellant was apprehended while trying to force a door through which he
could carry his booty of cigarettes, having failed in still
other attempts to pry open two cash registers or to find
other more valuable items in the store manager's desk.
On these facts, the court below would have been indulging the most tenuous of prescumptions to consider that
the appellant had other than felonious intentions.
The only remaining question is whether the jury,
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taking a reasonable view of the evidence, would haYe
been able lo find the appellant innocent of burglary
and guilty of unlawful <:ntry hecause of the conflicting
evidence on appellant's rnelltal competence at the time
of the crime. The state intrnduccd eviclence that, if belie\·ecl by the jury, would have led to the conclusion that
the appellant, although acting strange, had sufficient
ability to formulate burglarious iritent. The defense,
011 the other hand, introduced evidc11ce that, if hclievecl,
would have established that the appellant was co111plctcly
irrcs1>011siblc. In short, the jur~T was presented with one
of' two choi<"es: appellant wa" either guilty or innocent
of sccornl degree burglary. Given the fact that appellant made 110 attempt to show that grounds existed for
reaching some intermediate conclusion, the trial court
was correct in refusing to complicate the jury's choice
by dangling another, unexplored alternative before it.
Cf. State v. Gillian, supra, Ellet, J., dissenting.
011

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court below properly refused to give appellant's requested instructions.
Respondent therefore respectfully requests that the
verdict and judg1nent of the Third Judicial District
Court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. RO:l\INEY
Attorne,y General
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DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

Attorneys for Respandent

